Development and Testing

Topaz International part II: The Transition to Collaboration


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Today, we continue our look at the collaboration between the US and the USSR/Russia involving the Enisy reactor: Topaz International. Today, we’ll focus on the transfer from the USSR (which became Russia during this process) to the US, which was far more drama-ridden than I ever realized, as well as the management and bureaucratic challenges and amusements that occurred during the testing. Our next post will look at the testing program that occurred in the US, and the changes to the design once the US got involved. The final post will overview the plans for missions involving the reactors, and the aftermath of the Topaz International Program, as well as the recent history of the Enisy reactor.

For clarification: In this blog post (and the next one), the reactor will mostly be referred to as Topaz-II, however it’s the same as the Enisy (Yenisey is another common spelling) reactor discussed in the last post. Some modifications were made by the Americans over the course of the program, which will be covered in the next post, but the basic reactor architecture is the same.

When we left off, we had looked at the testing history within the USSR. The entry of the US into the list of customers for the Enisy reactor has some conflicting information: according to one document (Topaz-II Design History, Voss, linked in the references), the USSR approached a private (unnamed) US company in 1980, but the company did not purchase the reactor, instead forwarding the offer up the chain in the US, but this account has very few details other than that; according to another paper (US-Russian Cooperation… TIP, Dabrowski 2013, also linked), the exchange built out of frustration within the Department of Defense over the development of the SP-100 reactor for the Strategic Defense Initiative. We’ll look at the second, more fleshed out narrative of the start of the Topaz International Program, as the beginning of the official exchange of technology between the USSR (and soon after, Russia) and the US.

The Topaz International Program (TIP) was the final name for a number of programs that ended up coming under the same umbrella: the Thermionic System Evaluation Test (TSET) program, the Nuclear Electric Propulsion Space Test Program (NEPSTP), and some additional materials testing as part of the Thermionic Fuel Element Verification Program (TFEVP). We’ll look at the beginnings of the overall collaboration in this post, with the details of TSET, NEPSTP, TFEVP, the potential lunar base applications, and the aftermath of the Topaz International Program, in the next post.

Let’s start, though, with the official beginnings of the TIP, and the challenges involved in bringing the test articles, reactors, and test stands to the US in one of the most politically complex times in modern history. One thing to note here: this was most decidedly not the US just buying a set of test beds, reactor prototypes, and flight units (all unfueled), this was a true international technical exchange. Both the American and Soviet (later Russian) organizations involved on all levels were true collaborators in this program, with the Russian head of the program, Academician Nikolay Nikolayvich Ponomarev-Stepnoy, still being highly appreciative of the effort put into the program by his American counterparts as late as this decade, when he was still working to launch the reactor that resulted from the TIP – because it’s still not only an engineering masterpiece, but could perform a very useful role in space exploration even today.

The Beginnings of the Topaz International Program

While the US had invested in the development of thermionic power conversion systems in the 1960s, the funding cuts in the 1970s that affected so many astronuclear programs also bit into the thermionic power conversion programs, leading to their cancellation or diminution to the point of being insignificant. There were several programs run investigating this technology, but we won’t address them in this post, which is already going to run longer than typical even for this blog! An excellent resource for these programs, though, is Thermionics Quo Vadis by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, available in PDF here: https://www.nap.edu/catalog/10254/thermionics-quo-vadis-an-assessment-of-the-dtras-advanced-thermionics (paywall warning).

Our story begins in detail in 1988. The US was at the time heavily invested in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which as its main in-space nuclear power supply was focused on the SP-100 reactor system (another reactor that we’ll be covering in a Forgotten Reactors post or two). However, certain key players in the decision making process, including Richard Verga of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), the organizational lynchpin on the SDI. The SP-100 was growing in both cost and time to develop, leading him to decide to look elsewhere to either meet the specific power needs of SDI, or to find a fission power source that was able to operate as a test-bed for the SDI’s technologies.

Investigations into the technological development of all other nations’ astronuclear capabilities led Dr. Verga to realize that the most advanced designs were those of the USSR, who had just launched the two TOPOL-powered Plasma-A satellites. This led him to invite a team of Soviet space nuclear power program personnel to the Eighth Albuquerque Space Nuclear Power Symposium (the predecessor to today’s Nuclear and Emerging Technologies for Space, or NETS, conference, which just wrapped up recently at the time of this writing) in January of 1991. The invitation was accepted, and they brought a mockup of the TOPAZ. The night after their presentation, Academician Nikolay Nicolayvich Ponomarev-Stepnoy, the Russian head of the Topol program, along with his team of visiting academicians, met with Joe Wetch, the head of Space Power Incorporated (SPI, a company made up mostly of SNAP veterans working to make space fission power plants a reality), and they came to a general understanding: the US should buy this reactor from the USSR – assuming they could get both governments to agree to the sale. The terms of this “sale” would take significant political and bureaucratic wrangling, as we’ll see, and sadly the problems started less than a week later, thanks to their generosity in bringing a mockup of the Topaz reactor with them. While the researchers were warmly welcomed, and they themselves seemed to enjoy their time at the conference, when it came time to leave a significant bureaucratic hurdle was placed in their path.

Soviet researchers at Space Nuclear Power Symposium, 1991, image Dabrowski

This mockup, and the headaches surrounding being able to take it back with the researchers, were a harbinger of things to come. While this mockup was non-functional, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission claimed that, since it could theoretically be modified to be functional (a claim which I haven’t found any evidence for, but is theoretically possible), and as such was considered a “nuclear utilization facility” which could not be shipped outside the US. Five months later, and with the direct intervention of numerous elected officials, including US Senator Pete Domenici, the mockup was finally returned to Russia. This decision by the NRC led to a different approach to importing further reactors from the USSR and Russia, when the time came to do this. The mockup was returned, however, and whatever damage the incident caused to the newly-minted (hopeful) partnership was largely weathered thanks to the interpersonal relationships that were developed in Albuquerque.

Teams of US researchers (including Susan Voss, who was the major source for the last post) traveled to the USSR, to inspect the facilities used to build the Enisy (Yenisey is another common spelling, the reactor was named after the river in Siberia). These visits started in Moscow, with Drs Wetch and Britt of SPI, when a revelation came to the American astronuclear establishment: there wasn’t one thermionic reactor in the USSR, but two, and the most promising one was available for potential export and sale!

These visits continued, and personal relationships between the team members from both sides of the Iron Curtain grew. Due to headaches and bureaucratic difficulties in getting technical documentation translated effectively in the timeframe that the program required, often it was these interpersonal relationships that allowed the US team to understand the necessary technical details of the reactor and its components. The US team also visited many of the testing and manufacturing locations used in the production and development of the Enisy reactor (if you haven’t read it yet, check out the first blog post on the Enisy for an overview of how closely these were linked), as well as observing testing in Russia of these systems. This is also the time when the term “Topaz-II” was coined by one of the American team members, to differentiate the reactor from the original Topol (known in the west as Topaz, and covered in our first blog post on Soviet astronuclear history) in the minds of the largely uninformed Western academic circles.

The seeds of the first cross-Iron Curtain technical collaboration on astronuclear systems development, planted in Albuquerque, were germinating in Russian soil.

The Business of Intergovernmental Astronuclear Development

During this time, due to the headaches involved in both the US and the USSR from a bureaucratic point of view (I’ve never found any information that showed that the two teams ever felt that there were problems in the technological exchange, rather they all seem to be political and bureaucratic in nature, and exclusively from outside the framework of what would become known as the Topaz International Program), two companies were founded to provide an administrative touchstone for various points in the technological transfer program.

The first was International Scientific Products, which from the beginning (in 1989) was made specifically to facilitate the purchase of the reactors for the US, and worked closely with the SDIO Dr. Verga was still intimately involved, and briefed after every visit to Russia on progress in the technical exchange and eventual purchase of the reactors. This company was the private lubricant for the US government to be able to purchase these reactor systems (for reasons too complex to get into in this blog post). The two main players in ISP were Drs Wetch and Britt, who also appear to be the main administrative driving force in the visits. The company gave a legal means to transmit non-classified data from the USSR to the US, and vice versa. After each visit, these three would meet, and Dr. Verga kept his management at SDIO consistently briefed on the progress of the program.

The second was the International Nuclear Energy Research and Technology corporation, known as INERTEK. This was a joint US-USSR company, involving the staff of ISP, as well as individuals from all of the Soviet team of design bureaus, manufacturing centers (except possibly in Talinn, but I haven’t been able to confirm this, it’s mainly due to the extreme loss of documentation from that facility following the collapse of the USSR), and research institutions that we saw in the last post. These included the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (headed by Academician and Director Ponomarev-Stepnoy, the head of the Russian portion of the Topaz International Program), the Scientific Industrial Association “LUCH” (represented by Deputy Director Yuri Nikolayev), the Central Design Bureau for Machine Building (represented by Director Vladmir Nikitin), and the Keldysh Institute of Rocket Research (represented by Director Academician Anatoli Koreteev). INERTEK was the vehicle by which the technology, and more importantly to the bureaucrats the hardware, would be exported from the USSR to the US. Academician Ponomarev-Stepnoy was the director of the company, and Dr Wetch was his deputy. Due to the sensitive nature of the company’s focus, the company required approval from the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) in Moscow, which was finally achieved in December 1990.

In order to gain this approval, the US had to agree to a number of demands from Minatom. This included: the Topaz-II reactors had to be returned to Russia after the testing and that the reactors could not be used for military purposes. Dr. Verga insisted on additional international cooperation, including staff from the UK and France. This not only was a cost-saving measure, but reinforced the international and transparent nature of the program, and made military use more challenging.

While this was occurring, the Americans were insistent that the non-nuclear testing of the reactors had to be duplicated in the US, to ensure they met American safety and design criteria. This was a major sticking point for Minatom, and delayed the approval of the export for months, but the Americans did not slow in their preparations for building a test facility. Due to the concentration of space nuclear power research resources in New Mexico (with Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories, the US Air Force Philips Laboratory, and the University of New Mexico’s New Mexico Engineering Research Institute (NMERI), as well as the presence of the powerful Republican senator Pete Domenici to smooth political feathers in Washington, DC (all of the labs were within his Senatorial district in the north of the state), it was decided to test the reactors in Albuquerque, NM. The USAF purchased an empty building from the NMERI, and hired personnel from UNM to handle the human resources side of things. The selection of UNM emphasized the transparent, exploratory nature of the program, an absolute requirement for Minatom, and the university had considerable organizational flexibility when compared to either the USAF or the DOE. According to the contract manager, Tim Stepetic:

The University was very cooperative and accommodating… UNM allowed me to open checking accounts to provide responsive payments for the support requirements of the INTERTEK and LUCH contracts – I don’t think they’ve ever permitted such checkbook arrangements either before or since…”

These freedoms were necessary to work with the Russian team members, who were in culture shock and dealing with very different organizational restrictions than their American counterparts. As has been observed both before and since, the Russian scientists and technicians preferred to save as much of their (generous in their terms) per diem for after the project and the money would go further. They also covered local travel expenses as well. One of the technicians had to leave the US for Russia for his son’s brain tumor operation, and was asked by the surgeon to bring back some Tylenol, a request that was rapidly acquiesced to with bemusement from his American colleagues. In addition, personal calls (of a limited nature due to international calling rates at the time) were allowed for the scientists and technicians to keep in touch with their families and reduce their homesickness.

As should be surprising to no-one, the highly unusual nature of this financial arrangement, as well as the large amount of money involved (which ended up coming out to about $400,000 in 1990s money), a routine audit led to the Government Accounting Office being called in to investigate the arrangement later. Fortunately, no significant irregularities in the financial dealings of the NMERI were found, and the program continued. Additionally, the reuse of over $500,000 in equipment scrounged from SNL and LANL’s junk yards allowed for incredible cost savings in the program.

With the business side of the testing underway, it was time to begin preparations for the testing of the reactors in the US, beginning with the conversion of an empty building into a non-nuclear test facility. The building’s conversion, under the head of Frank Thome on the facilities modification side, and Scott Wold as the TSET training manager, began in April of 1991, only four months after Minatom’s approval of INTERTEK. Over the course of the next year, the facility would be prepared for testing, and would be completed just before the delivery of the first shipment of reactors and equipment from Russia.

By this point, the test program had grown to include two programs. The first was the Thermionic Systems Evaluation Test (TSET), which would study mechanical, thermophysical, and chemical properties of the reactors to verify the data collected in Russia. This was to flight-qualify the reactors for American space mission use, and establish the collaboration of the various international participants in the Topaz International Program.

The second program was the Nuclear Electric Propulsion Space Test Program (NEPSTP); run by the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, and funded by the SDIP Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, it proposed an experimental spacecraft that would use a set of six different electric thrusters, as well as equipment to monitor the environmental effects of both the thrusters and the reactor during operation. Design work for the spacecraft began almost immediately after the TSET program began, and the program was of interest to both the American and Russian parts of the team.

Later, one final program would be added: the Thermionic Fuel Element Verification Program (TFEVP). This program, which had predated TIP, is where many of the UK and French researchers were involved, and focused of increasing the lifetime of the thermionic fuel elements from one year (the best US estimate before the TSET) to at least three, and preferably seven, years. This would be achieved through better knowledge of materials properties, as well as improved manufacturing methods.

Finally, there were smaller programs that were attached to the big three, looking at materials effets in intense radiation and plasma environments, as well as long-term contact with cesium vapor, chemcal reactions within the hardware itself, and the surface electrical properties of various ceramics. These tests, while not the primary focus of the program, WOULD contribute to the understanding of the environment an astronuclear spacecraft would experience, and would significantly affect future spacecraft designs. These tests would occur in the same building as the TSET testing, and the teams involved would frequently collaborate on all projects, leading to a very well-integrated and collegial atmosphere.

Reactor Shipment: A Funny Little Thing Occurred in Russia

While all of this was going on in the Topaz International Program, major changes were happening thoughout the USSR: it was falling apart. From the uprisings in Latvia and Lithuania (violently put down by the Soviet military), to the fall of the Berlin Wall, to the ultimate lowering of the hammer and sickle from the Kremlin in December 1991 and its replacement with the tricolor of the Russian Federation, the fall of the Iron Curtain was accelerating. The TIP teams were continuing to work at their program, knowing that it offered hope for the Topaz-II project as well as a vehicle to form closer technological collaborations with their former adversaries, but the complications would rear their heads in this small group as well.

The American purchase of the Topaz reactors was approved by President George H.W. Bush on 27 March, 1992 during a meeting with his Secretary of State, James Barker, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. This freed the American side of the collaboration to do what needed to be done to make the program happen, as well as begin bringing in Russian specialists to begin test facility preparations.

Trinity site obelisk

The first group of 14 Russian scientists and technicians to arrive in the US for the TSET program arrived on April 3, 1992, but only got to sleep for a few hours before being woken up by their guests (who also brought their families) for a long van journey. This was something that the Russians greatly appreciated, because April 4 is a special day in one small part of the world: it’s one of only two days of the year that the Trinity Site, the location of the first nuclear explosion in history, is open to the public. According to one of them, Georgiy Kompaniets:

It was like for a picnic! And at the entrance to the site there were souvenir vendors selling t-shirts with bombs and rocks supposedly at the epicenter of the blast…” (note: no trinitite is allowed to be collected at the Trinity site anymore, and according to some interpretations of federal law is considered low-level radioactive waste from weapons production)

The Russians were a hit at the Trinity site, being the center of attention from those there, and were interviewed for television. They even got to tour the McDonald ranch house, where the Gadget was assembled and the blast was initiated. This made a huge impression on the visiting Russians, and did wonders in cementing the team’s culture.

Hot air balloon in New Mexico, open source

Another cultural exchange that occurred later (exactly when I’m not sure) was the chance to ride in a hot air balloon. Albuquerque’s International Balloon Fiesta is the largest hot air ballooning event in the world, and whenever atmospheric conditions are right a half dozen or more balloons can be seen floating over the city. A local ballooning club, having heard about the Russian scientists and technicians (they had become minor local celebrities at this point) offered them a free hot air balloon ride. This is something that the Russians universally accepted, since none of them had ever experienced this.

According to Boris Steppenov:

The greatest difficulty, it seemed, was landing. And it was absolutely forbidden to touch down on the reservations belonging to the Native Americans, as this would be seen as an attack on their land and an affront to their ancestors…

[after the flight] there were speeches, there were oaths, there was baptism with champagne, and many other rituals. A memory for an entire life!”

The balloon that Steppenov flew in did indeed land on the Sandia Pueblo Reservation, but before touchdown the tribal police were notified, and they showed up to the landing site, issued a ticket to the ballooning company, and allowed them to pack up and leave.

These events, as well as other uniquely New Mexican experiences, cemented the TIP team into a group of lifelong friends, and would reinforce the willingness of everyone to work together as much as possible to make TIP as much of a success as it could be.

C-141 taking off, image DOD

In late April, 1992, a team of US military personnel (led by Army Major Fred Tarantino of SDIO, with AF Major Dan Mulder in charge of logistics), including a USAF Airlift Control Element Team, landed in St. Petersburg on a C-141 and C-130, carrying the equipment needed to properly secure the test equipment and reactors that would be flown to the US. Overflight permissions were secured, and special packing cases, especially for the very delicate tungsten TISA heaters, were prepared. These preparations were complicated by the lack of effective packing materials for these heaters, until Dr. Britt of both ISP and INTERTEK had the idea of using foam bedding pads from a furniture store. Due to the large size and weight of the equipment, though, the C-141 and C-130 aircraft were not sufficient for airlifting the equipment, so the teams had to wait on the larger C-5 Galaxy transports intended for this task, which were en route from the US at the time.

Sadly, when the time came for the export licenses to be given to the customs officer, he refused to honor them – because they were Soviet documents, and the Soviet Union no longer existed. This led Academician Ponomarev-Stepnoy and INTERTEK’s director, Benjamin Usov, to travel to Moscow on April 27 to meet with the Chairman of the Government, Alexander Shokhin, to get new export licenses. After consulting with the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, Sergei Glazev, a one-time, urgent export license was issued for the shipment to the US. This was then sent via fast courier to St. Petersburg on May 1.

C-5 Galaxy, image USAF

The C-5s, though, weren’t in Russia yet. Once they did land, though, a complex paperwork ballet needed to be carried out to get the reactors and test equipment to America. First, the reactors were purchased by INTERTEK from the Russian bureaus responsible for the various components. Then, INTERTEK would sell the reactors and equipment to Dr. Britt of ISP once the equipment was loaded onto the C-5. Dr. Britt then immediately resold the equipment to the US government. This then avoided the import issues that would have occurred on the US side if the equipment had been imported by ISP, a private company, or INTERTEK, a Russian-led international consortium.

One of them landed in St. Petersburg on May 6, was loaded with the two Topaz-II reactors (V-71 and Ya-21U) and as much equipment as could be fit in the aircraft, and left the same day. It would arrive in Albuquerque on May 7. The other developed maintenance problems, and was forced to wait in England for five days, finally arriving on May 8. The rest of the equipment was loaded up (including the Baikal vacuum chamber), and the plane left later that day. Sadly, it ran into difficulties again upon reaching England, as was forced to wait two more days for it to be repaired, arriving in Albuquerque on May 12.

Preparations for Testing: Two Worlds Coming Together

Unpacking and beryllium checks at TSET Facility in Albuquerque, Image DOE/NASA

Once the equipment was in the US, detailed examination of the payload was required due to the beryllium used in the reflectors and control drums of the reactor. Berylliosis, or the breathing in of beryllium dust, is a serious health issue, and one that the DOE takes incredibly seriously (they’ll evacuate an entire building at the slightest possibility that beryllium dust could be present, at the cost of millions of dollars on occasion). Detailed checks, both before the equipment was removed from the aircraft and during the unpackaging of the reactors. However, no detectable levels of beryllium dust were detected, and the program continued with minimal disruption.

Then it came time to unbox the equipment, but another problem arose: this required the approval of the director of the Central Design Bureau of Heavy Machine Building, Vladmir Nikitin, who was in Moscow. Rather than just call him for approval, Dr Britt called and got approval for Valery Sinkevych, the Albuquerque representative for INTERTEK, to have discretional control over these sorts of decisions. The approval was given, greatly smoothing the process of both setup and testing during TIP.

Sinkevych, Scott Wold and Glen Schmidt worked closely together in the management of the project. Both were on hand to answer questions, smooth out difficulties, and other challenges in the testing process, to the point that the Russians began calling Schmidt “The Walking Stick.” His response was classic: that’s my style, “Management by Walking Around.”

Soviet technicians at TSET Test Facility, image Dabrowski

Every day, Schmidt would hold a lab-wide meeting, ensuring everyone was present, before walking everyone through the procedures that needed to be completed for the day, as well as ensuring that everyone had the resources that they needed to complete their tasks. He also made sure that he was aware of any upcoming issues, and worked to resolve them (mostly through Wetch and Britt) before they became an issue for the facility preparations. This was a revelation to the Russian team, who despite working on the program (in Russia) for years, often didn’t know anything other than the component that they worked on. This synthesis of knowledge would continue throughout the program, leading to a far

Initial estimates for the time that it would take to prepare the facility and equipment for testing of the reactors were supposed to be 9 months. Due to both the well-integrated team, as well as the more relaxed management structure of the American effort, this was completed in only 6 ½ months. According to Sinkevych:

The trust that was formed between the Russian and American side allowed us in an unusually short time to complete the assembly of the complex and demonstrate its capabilities.”

This was so incredible to Schmidt that he went to Wetch and Britt, asking for a bonus for the Russians due to their exceptional work. This was approved, and paid proportional to technical assignment, duration, and quality of workmanship. This was yet another culture shock for the Russian team, who had never received a bonus before. The response was twofold: greatly appreciative, and also “if we continue to save time, do we get another bonus?” The answer to this was a qualified “perhaps,” and indeed one more, smaller bonus was paid due to later time savings.

Installation of Topaz-II reactor at TSET Facility, image DOE/NASA

Mid-Testing Drama, and the Second Shipment

Both in the US and Russia, there were many questions about whether this program was even possible. The reason for its success, though, is unequivocally that it was a true partnership between the American and Russian parts of TIP. This was the first Russian-US government-to-government cooperative program after the fall of the USSR. Unlike the Nunn-Lugar agreement afterward, TIP was always intended to be a true technological exchange, not an assistance program, which is one of the main reasons why the participants of TIP still look fondly and respectfully at the project, while most Russian (and other former Soviet states) participants in N-L consider it to be demeaning, condescending, and not something to ever be repeated again. More than this, though, the Russian design philosophy that allowed full-system, non-nuclear testing of the Topaz-II permanently changed American astronuclear design philosophy, and left its mark on every subsequent astronuclear design.

However, not all organizations in the US saw it this way. Drs. Thorne and Mulder provided excellent bureaucratic cover for the testing program, preventing the majority of the politics of government work from trickling down to the management of the test itself. However, as Scott Wold, the TSET training manager pointed out, they would still get letters from outside organizations stating:

[after careful consideration] they had concluded that an experiment we proposed to do wouldn’t be possible and that we should just stop all work on the project as it was obviously a waste of time. Our typical response was to provide them with the results of the experiment we had just wrapped up.”

As mentioned, this was not uncommon, but was also a minor annoyance. In fact, if anything it cemented the practicality of collaborations of this nature, and over time reduced the friction the program faced through proof of capabilities. Other headaches would arise, but overall they were relatively minor.

Sadly, one of the programs, NEPSTP, was canceled out from under the team near the completion of the spacecraft. The new Clinton administration was not nearly as open to the use of nuclear power as the Bush administration had been (to put it mildly), and as such the program ended in 1993.

One type of drama that was avoided was the second shipment of four more Topaz-II reactors from Russia to the US. These were the Eh-40, Eh-41, Eh-43, and Eh-44 reactors. The use of these terms directly contradicts the earlier-specified prefixes for Soviet determinations of capabilities (the systems were built, then assessed for suitability for mechanical, thermal, and nuclear capabilities after construction, for more on this see our first Enisy post here). These units were for: Eh-40 thermal-hydraulic mockup, with a functioning NaK heat rejection system, for “cold-test” testing of thermal covers during integration, launch, and orbital injection; Eh-41 structural mockup for mechanical testing, and demonstration of the mechanical integrity of the anticriticality device (more on that in the next post), modified thermal cover, and American launch vehicle integration; Eh-43 and -44 were potential flight systems, which would undergo modal testing, charging of the NaK coolant system, fuel loading and criticality testing, mechanical vibration, shock, and acoustic tests, 1000 hour thermal vacuum steady-state stability and NaK system integrity tests, and others before launch.

An-124, image Wikimedia

How was drama avoided in this case? The previous shipment was done by the US Air Force, which has many regulations involved in the transport of any cargo, much less flight-capable nuclear reactors containing several toxic substances. This led to delays in approval the first time this shipment method was used. The second time, in 1994, INTERTEK and ISP contracted a private cargo company, Russian Volga Dnepr Airlines, to transport these four reactors. In order to do this, Volga Dnepr Airlines used their An-124 to fly these reactors from St. Petersburg to Albuquerque.

For me personally, this was a very special event, because I was there. My dad got me out of school (I wasn’t even a teenager yet), drove me out to the landing strip fence at Kirtland AFB, and we watched with about 40 other people as this incredible aircraft landed. He told me about the shipment, and why they were bringing it in, and the seed of my astronuclear obsession was planted.

No beryllium dust was found in this shipment, and the reactors were prepared for testing. Additional thermophysical testing, as well as design work for modifications needed to get the reactors flight-qualified and able to be integrated with the American launchers, were conducted on these reactors. These tests and changes will be the subject of the next blog post, as well as the missions that were proposed for the reactors.

These tests would continue until 1995, and the end of testing in Albuquerque. All reactors were packed up, and returned to Russia per the agreement between INTERTEK and Minatom. The Enisy would continue to be developed in Russia until at least 2007.

More Coming Soon!

The story of the Topaz International Program is far from over. The testing in the US, as well as the programs that the US/Russian team had planned have not even been touched on yet besides very cursory mentions. These programs, as well as the end of the Topaz International Program and the possible future of the Enisy reactor, are the focus of our next blog post, the final one in this series.

This program provided a foundation, as well as a harbinger of challenges to come, in international astronuclear collaboration. As such, I feel that it is a very valuable subject to spend a significant amount of time on.

I hope to have the next post out in about a week and a half to two weeks, but the amount of research necessary for this series has definitely surprised me. The few documents available that fill in the gaps are, sadly, behind paywalls that I can’t afford to breach at my current funding availability.

As such, I ask, once again, that you support me on Patreon. You can find my page at https://www.patreon.com/beyondnerva every dollar counts.

References:

US-Russian Cooperation in Science and Technology: A Case Study of the TOPAZ Space-Based Nuclear Reactor International Program, Dabrowski 2013 https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Richard_Dabrowski/publication/266516447_US-Russian_Cooperation_in_Science_and_Technology_A_Case_Study_of_the_TOPAZ_Space-Based_Nuclear_Reactor_International_Program/links/5433d1e80cf2bf1f1f2634b8/US-Russian-Cooperation-in-Science-and-Technology-A-Case-Study-of-the-TOPAZ-Space-Based-Nuclear-Reactor-International-Program.pdf

Topaz-II Design Evolution, Voss 1994 http://gnnallc.com/pdfs/NPP%2014%20Voss%20Topaz%20II%20Design%20Evolution%201994.pdf

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